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Odido Data Breach – 6.2 Million Customers Exposed · Tech Talks With Kinsoft

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Usually when we talk about a massive corporate
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cyber attack, there's this expectation of immediate
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visible chaos. Oh yeah, you picture the movie
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Bank Robbery, right? Exactly. Like alarms blaring,
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servers locking down, screens turning red with,
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I don't know, some ominous skull logo. Right,
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and the company instantly panicking because someone
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has loudly kicked the digital door in. Yeah,
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but what about that silent heist? You know, where
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the burglar walks right through the front door,
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waves at the security guard, and just completely
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empties the vault. And the bank doesn't even
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know they've been robbed until the thief politely
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calls them a few days later to ask for a payoff.
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Which is wildly exactly what just happened to
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6 .2 million customers of the Dutch telecom Odido.
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It really is. I mean, the modern threat landscape
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has shifted dramatically away from operational
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disruption and it's moved toward quiet extraction.
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So the technical alarms never even trip because,
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well, the attackers don't actually break the
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system. No, they don't. They just log in, they
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take what they want and they leave without a
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trace. Welcome to Tech Talks with Kinsoft. Whether
1:01
you are a seasoned tech professional catching
1:03
up on industry news, or you are just intensely
1:07
curious about how the digital world actually
1:09
works behind the scenes, you're in the exact
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right place. We are super glad to have you with
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us today. Today we are analyzing a major rapidly
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developing story out of Europe, and we're going
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to do it without overwhelming you with jargon.
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We are looking at a colossal data breach at Odido.
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The mobile phone carrier, formerly known as T
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-Mobile Netherlands. And based on recent reporting
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in Security Week and other sources, this is a
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big one. It really is. So our mission today is
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to unpack the timeline of this attack, rigorously
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analyze the exact nature of the compromised data,
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and explore this really unusual silence from
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the threat actors involved. Yeah, because the
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timeline and the target selection here provide
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this... this masterclass and how modern threat
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actors operate, we really aren't looking at a
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brute force attack on a core database here. Right.
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We are looking at a highly targeted strike on
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the human element of the organization. But before
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we detail what was stolen, we need to establish
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the sheer scale of the incident. Definitely.
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Because it really explains why this specific
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breach demands your attention. So the attack
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occurred recently, specifically over the weekend
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of February 7th and 8th, 2026. And it impacted
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customers of both the primary Odido brand and
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its subsidiary, Ben. Yeah, and the initial company
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notice stated over 6 million customers were impacted.
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But a company representative reportedly told
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local media that the number is actually roughly
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6 .2 million. Which is just a staggering footprint.
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Okay, let's unpack this for a second. I mean,
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6 .2 million people is essentially more than
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a third of the entire population of the Netherlands.
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Wow. Yeah, that puts it into perspective. It's
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like a bad weather system that somehow managed
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to rain on almost half the country's digital
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front porches at exactly the same time. If you
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walk onto a commuter train in Amsterdam tomorrow,
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statistically, one in every three people sitting
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in that car just had their foundational identity
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documents stolen. And what's fascinating here
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is that this massive footprint is a direct result
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of where the attackers aimed. They didn't compromise
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the core telecommunications infrastructure. So
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the cell towers and routing switches are fine.
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Exactly. The core network backbone, all of that
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remained completely untouched. Instead, they
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hit a customer contact system. A customer contact
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system. Okay. Why that specific target? Well,
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when threat actors target a customer service
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silo, it yields a very specific, very concentrated
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data set. Customer service reps need immediate
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access to comprehensive user profiles, right?
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Right, to verify who they're talking to and fix
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issues quickly. Exactly. That system is inherently
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designed for fast data retrieval, which makes
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it an absolute goldmine if an unauthorized user
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gains access. So if they have unhindered access
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to this specific silo, how do they actually get
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in? I mean, you'd assume a telecom giant operating
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at a national scale would have massive digital
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wall. You would think so, yeah. We're talking
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zero trust architectures, strict multi -factor
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authentication, robust endpoint detection. Sure,
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but technology can only protect you up to the
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point where an authorized human overrides it.
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Reports allege that the attackers in this incident
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are linked to the notorious group Shiny Hunters.
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Oh, wow. Shiny hunters. Yeah. And they didn't
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burn a highly sophisticated multimillion dollar
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zero day exploit to break through Odido's firewalls.
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They just use social engineering. So they bypassed
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the technological tech entirely by manipulating
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the people who manage it. Precisely. Specifically,
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they utilized phishing and they actually impersonated
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internal IT staff to bypass the multi -factor
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authentication. That is wild. We spend millions
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on these complex security architectures. But
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if an attacker just calls the help desk, sounds
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confident, and convincingly asks for an MFA reset.
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The walls come tumbling down. It really highlights
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the vulnerability of the human firewall. It does,
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because help desks and customer support centers
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are, by definition, structurally designed to
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be helpful. Right. Their whole job is to fix
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things fast. Yeah. Their primary performance
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metric is usually how quickly they can resolve
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an internal issue and get an employee back to
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work. And threat actors absolutely. know this.
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So how does that call actually play out? Well,
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an attacker impersonating IT might call an employee.
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claim there is, say, a critical synchronization
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error on their account, and send a fraudulent
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MFA prompt under the guise of testing the connection.
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And the employee, just assuming they're interacting
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with a colleague trying to fix a problem, they
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approve the prompt. Exactly. The technology functioned
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perfectly. It verified the prompt was approved,
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but the human context was entirely fraudulent.
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And once inside... The attacker essentially inherits
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the legitimate privileges of that compromised
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employee. They sure do. Which brings us to the
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actual payload, because once they were inside
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that customer contact system, they had access
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to a very specific inventory of data. A very
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dangerous inventory. According to the disclosure,
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the hacker stole an incredibly detailed list
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of personal information. We are talking names,
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home addresses, phone numbers, email addresses,
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dates of birth, customer numbers, bank account
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numbers. And crucially, this is the really bad
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part. Yeah, the linchpin of the whole disaster
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passport or driver's license numbers, along with
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their exact validity dates. That combination
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of data points represents a complete self -contained
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identity package. It is far more dangerous than,
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you know, a simple database dump of emails and
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passwords. Well, let's look at what the company
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noted they didn't get. phone services themselves
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were not impacted. And importantly, no user passwords
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were stolen. Right. No call records, no text
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message logs, and no invoice or billing data
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were compromised. Odito really emphasized this
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point. Of course they did. It sounds like good
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news. But here's where it gets really interesting.
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They bypassed the highly sensitive call logs
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and passwords, but grabbed all the foundational
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identity documents. It's like a burglar sneaking
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into your house, completely ignoring your diary
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and your keys, but running off with your filing.
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cabinet and your bank statements. That is a perfect
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analogy. So I have to ask, does the fact that
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passwords weren't taken make this less severe?
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Or is the ID data actually a bigger nightmare
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for these 6 .2 million people? Oh, the loss of
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the ID data is unequivocally the larger disaster.
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Think about it. Passwords are inherently transient.
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Right. They're meant to be changed. Exactly.
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They are dynamic security controls designed to
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be discarded. If a database of passwords leaks
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today, the company just forces a mandatory global
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reset. You type in a new string of characters
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and the stolen data becomes entirely worthless
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to the attacker in a matter of seconds. Right.
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It really is like changing the locks on your
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front door. But the data stolen from Odido, your
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date of birth, your national identity number,
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your passport number, the validity dates of those
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documents, your bank account details. These are
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completely static. You can't exactly just update
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your date of birth. No, you can't. They are the
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foundational anchors of your societal identity.
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You cannot simply log into a government portal
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and click reset on your passport history. Replacing
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a government ID is a massive bureaucratic headache.
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You have to physically go to an office, prove
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who you are all over again, pay fees, and wait
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weeks. And even then, your historical data is
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still intrinsically tied to you. But are they
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going to use these passports to open fraudulent
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credit cards? Or is there a bigger secondary
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market for this? Because a passport number alone
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without the physical book doesn't get you through
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airport security. Well, they don't need to get
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through an airport. They need to get through
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automated digital verification systems. the financial
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sector relies heavily on know your customer or
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kyc regulations when you open an account at an
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online bank a cryptocurrency exchange or a brokerage
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the institution doesn't see you in person. Right.
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They rely on cross -referencing the data you
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provide against government and credit databases.
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Exactly. So if an attacker has your real name,
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address, date of birth, bank account number,
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and the exact validity dates of your passport,
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they possess the perfect recipe to defeat modern
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KYC algorithms. Wow. So they aren't just stealing
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your identity, they're essentially cloning it.
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They can spin up an entirely parallel digital
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life. That is the ultimate goal. With a complete
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package, which is often referred to on the dark
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web as fool's a malicious actor, doesn't bother
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trying to hack into your existing Odido account
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or your current checking account. Because that
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carries too much risk of triggering an alert.
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Exactly. Instead, they go to a completely different
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financial institution and open a brand new account
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in your name. They apply for high yield loans.
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They establish lines of credit. They use your
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pristine financial history to extract cash. And
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you remain completely unaware. until the collection
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agencies start calling months later. Yep. Untangling
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that type of synthetic identity fraud requires
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hundreds of hours of legal wrangling, and it
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can ruin a person's credit standing for years.
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So while Odido is technically accurate in reassuring
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people that their account passwords are safe,
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the attackers walked away with an asset that
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is infinitely more valuable and permanent. Without
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a doubt. That terrifying asymmetry in data value
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makes the company's response and the broader
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aftermath of this incident really critical to
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analyze. Yeah. Let's look at the immediate containment.
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Okay. Odido states that they immediately closed
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the attackers' access to their systems, implemented
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additional security measures, and notified the
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relevant regulatory and law enforcement authorities.
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Which is standard, yeah. Right. And they're actively
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notifying the affected users via email or phone,
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warning them to be on high alert for phishing
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attempts. They've also partnered with cybersecurity
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experts to monitor the dark web. And what have
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they found so far? Well, as of the reporting,
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they are currently not aware of the stolen information
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being published online. And that right there,
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the absence of that data on the dark web, is
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the pivot point of the entire narrative. What
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do you mean? It tells us exactly what kind of
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operation we are observing. If we connect this
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to the bigger picture, it explains a lot. Because
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that's the mystery of the missing threat actor.
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Right. Odito hasn't officially shared details
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on the threat actor in their public notice. And
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no known ransomware or extortion group appears
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to have publicly claimed responsibility for it
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on their leak sites. Which is very unusual for
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a typical ransomware group. Yeah. But reports
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allege that Odito only actually learned of the
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massive data theft when the attackers contacted
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them directly to launch an extortion attempt.
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Exactly. So what does this all mean? They bypass
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the alarms. steal the data quietly, and then
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basically call the CEO. Usually, we hear about
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ransomware groups making massive public demands.
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Right. They freeze the servers, put a countdown
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timer on a public leak site, and shame the company
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into paying. But here, the systems are running
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perfectly fine, the data isn't leaked, and there's
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just silence. So they've done math. They know
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the regulatory fines are going to be catastrophic,
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don't they? That is the exact leverage they're
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exploiting. We are witnessing a stark evolution
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in cyber extortion tactics here. How so? The
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traditional ransomware model, you know, encrypting
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computers so a company cannot do business, is
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incredibly loud. It immediately brings the full
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weight of international law enforcement down
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on the hacking group because critical infrastructure
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is disrupted. Sure, nobody can make phone calls,
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so the police get involved immediately. Right.
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But the new model, which we see allegedly utilized
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by groups like Shiny Hunters, is pure data extortion.
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They don't break the network. Odido's mobile
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phones kept connecting to towers just fine. The
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attackers quietly copied the database and slipped
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out the back door. Yes. So the leverage is no
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longer pay us or your business stays offline.
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The leverage is pay us or we will unleash an
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absolute regulatory and public relations catastrophe
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upon you. Let's dig into that regulatory doom,
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because if they dump 6 .2 million European citizens
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passports and bank accounts online, the legal
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fallout for the telecom company has to be astronomical.
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Oh, it is. The European regulatory environment
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is completely unforgiving when it comes to data
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protection. We're talking about GDPR, right?
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Yes. Under the General Data Protection Regulation,
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companies can face fines of up to 4 % of their
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global annual revenue for failing to adequately
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protect consumer data. Wait, 4 % of global revenue?
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That is massive. And that is just the baseline.
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You also have the Dutch Data Protection Authority
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stepping in to launch an independent investigation
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which carries its own penalties. The inevitable
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class action lawsuits from the millions of victims
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whose static identities are now permanently at
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risk. Exactly. The financial impact of the data
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becoming public easily stretches into the hundreds
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of millions of euros. So the attackers are basically
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presenting a twisted business proposition. They're
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saying, we know a breach of this magnitude will
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cost you half a billion euros in fines, lawsuits
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and brand damage. Pay us 20 million quietly and
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we delete the data. It's a bargain. It is a cold,
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calculated risk assessment forced upon the victim,
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and it entirely explains the public silence.
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The attackers do not want to publish the data
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yet. Because the threat of publication is the
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only thing giving them leverage. Exactly. If
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they dump it online out of frustration, Odito
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suddenly has absolutely no incentive to pay the
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extortion fee. The damage is already done. Right.
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So the threat actors keep it quiet, they keep
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it off the public leak sites, and they attempt
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to negotiate in the shadows. That's the play
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here. But let's play this out. What if the company
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calls their bluff? Odido refuses to pay a dime
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or the negotiations break down. Are the attackers
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just going to sit on a goldmine of 6 .2 million
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passports? If they don't dump it publicly to
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shame the company, what is the secondary play?
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Hoarding the data for private. Secondary exploitation
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is the highly probable backup plan. Meaning they
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sell it quietly. Yes. Even if the primary extortion
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against the corporation fails, this specific
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data set is incredibly valuable in the cyber
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criminal underground. They don't have to dump
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it publicly on a forum where security researchers
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can analyze it. They could just sell it piecemeal
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to other criminals. Right. They can quietly sell
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it in chunks to closed door fraud rings who specialize
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in the identity cloning we discussed earlier.
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Or even more insidiously, they can use it themselves
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to launch highly targeted secondary phishing
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campaigns against the Odido customers. Wait,
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why use a leaked database for phishing, though?
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I mean, I get spam emails every day telling me
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my streaming account is locked and I just ignore
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them. You ignore them because they are generic
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and lack context. But imagine the scenario for
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these 6 .2 million users. Okay, I'm imagining
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it. You know your data was compromised in the
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Uduto breach, right? It's national news. Two
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weeks later, you receive an email that appears
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to be from your primary bank. And it says something
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like, we noticed suspicious activity related
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to the recent telecom breach. Exactly. Please
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click here to verify your account. But the reason
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this works is the attacker includes your actual
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real bank account number and the expiration date
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of your passport right there in the email body.
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Oh, wow. That changes the psychology entirely.
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If I see an email with my actual passport expiration
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date in it, my brain immediately assumes it has
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to be legitimate. The level of trust is established
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instantly. Exactly. The attackers leverage the
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static data stolen in the first breach to manufacture
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unquestionable trust. This lowers your guard,
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allowing them to extract the one thing they didn't
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get from Odido. Your passwords. Yes. They use
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the static data to trick you into handing over
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the dynamic data. It is a vicious, compounding
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cycle of compromise that relies entirely on the
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fact that these foundational identifiers are
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implicitly trusted by both institutions and individuals.
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It really paints a stark picture of just how
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fragile our entire digital ecosystem is. I mean,
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we trust these massive corporations with the
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foundational documents. of our lives, and one
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successful, well -crafted phone call to an IT
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help desk can expose a third of a country's population.
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It really fundamentally challenges how we think
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about security. It absolutely does. So to quickly
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recap the ground we've covered today for you,
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we analyzed the colossal data breach at Odido,
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impacting roughly 6 .2 million customers. and
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the attackers who are linked to shiny hunters
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bypass technical defenses by leveraging social
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engineering and help desk impersonation to slip
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past multi -factor authentication right they
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targeted a customer contact system completely
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ignoring changeable data like passwords and instead
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extracted an absolute gold mine of static identity
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documents passports driver's licenses And bank
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accounts. And now the entire situation is shrouded
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in an unusual silence driven by behind the scenes
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data extortion and the looming threat of massive
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regulatory and legal fallout across Europe. Which
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really is a textbook case study demonstrating
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why the cybersecurity landscape is shifting.
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Protecting the perimeter is clearly no longer
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sufficient when the human element remains the
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most critical vulnerability. And when the data
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itself has become the ultimate leverage. As we
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wrap up this discussion, we want to leave you
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with a final thought to mull over. Yeah, because
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the Odido breach forces us to confront an uncomfortable
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reality about the architecture of trust. This
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raises an important question. What happens to
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the value of our digital identities when hackers
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realize that quietly hoarding static documents
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like passports and bank numbers is far more lucrative
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than stealing easily changeable passwords? How
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do we protect something we can't easily reset?
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It's a critical question we all need to be asking
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ourselves, both as individual consumers navigating
18:33
the digital world and as professionals architecting
18:36
corporate infrastructure. Absolutely. If this
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story has you thinking about your own organization's
18:41
vulnerabilities and perhaps realizing it's time
18:44
to evaluate how you handle, segment, and protect
18:47
sensitive data against the human element, we
18:49
highly encourage you to visit www .kinsoft .com
18:53
.au to discuss your own security and IT needs.
18:56
You can't just build a taller digital wall. You
18:59
really have to plan for what happens when someone
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just talks their way through the front door.
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Thank you so much for tuning in to Tech Talks
19:05
with Kinsoft. Thanks for listening. Stay safe
19:07
out there, keep a close eye on your static data,
19:09
and we will see you next time.