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Booking.com – Hotel-Partner Breach Fuels Travel Scams · Tech Talks With Kinsoft

• 0:00
  Imagine you are, uh, you're packing your bags
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  for a highly anticipated trip to Rome. Oh, it
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  sounds amazing. Right. Your flight leaves tomorrow.
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  But suddenly, your phone buzzes. Okay. It is
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  a WhatsApp message from your hotel. And it greets
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  you by name, it confirms your exact travel dates,
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  and it even cites your internal booking reference
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  number. That is very specific. Yeah, exactly.
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  And the message politely explains that, well...
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  The local city tax requires a quick re -verification
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  of the credit card on file, providing a link
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  to complete the process before your arrival.
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  Which seems completely normal. It seems entirely
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  accurate, completely professional, and honestly,
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  utterly terrifying. Because that message didn't
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  come from the hotel. It came from a hacker. Welcome
• 0:44
  to Tech Talks with Kinsoft. Glad to be here.
• 0:46
  Our mission on this show is straightforward.
• 0:48
  we take a massive stack of sources you know articles
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  technical research endless notes and we extract
• 0:55
  the most important nuggets of knowledge specifically
• 0:57
  curated for you right we synthesize the complexities
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  so you can absorb the insights without the information
• 1:03
  overload and today we are exploring the massive
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  april 2026 data breach involving the global travel
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  giant booking .com a huge story yeah massive
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  our insights today are pulled directly from recent
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  reporting by tech crunch and help net security
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  and to set up the stakes here i want you to think
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  of this like well like I like this analogy. Thanks.
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  But later, you find out someone made a copy of
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  your key, not at the main office with all the
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  security cameras and guards, but at the parking
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  garage down the street where they actually park
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  the cars. Yeah, that valet analogy perfectly
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  visualizes the architecture of the vulnerability
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  we are looking at today. It is a story about
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  the periphery, not the center. But I want to
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  challenge the initial reaction people might have
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  to this news. I mean, we hear about data breaches
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  constantly, right? Right, every week. Exactly.
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  Our emails are out there. Our passwords have
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  been involved in a dozen leaks. So why should
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  you, the listener, actually care about this specific
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  one? Well, the fatigue is entirely understandable.
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  However, this incident demands your attention
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  because it isn't about stolen data in the traditional
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  binary sense. Okay, what do you mean? This is
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  really a masterclass in how modern cyber criminals
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  weaponize your trust by stealing the context
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  of your life. Weaponizing trust. OK, let's unpack
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  this. According to the reporting around April
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  13th, 2026, Booking .com began notifying its
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  customers of suspicious activity. That's right.
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  And the notifications were pretty specific about
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  the exposed data. It was names, email addresses,
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  physical addresses, phone numbers and booking
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  details. Yeah, but there is one line. that really
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  caught my eye. It said the hackers had access
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  to, quote, anything that you may have shared
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  with the accommodation. And that open -ended
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  field is the absolute goldmine for an attacker.
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  It holds all the nuances of your travel. Yet
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  at the same time, TechCrunch reported that Booking
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  .com explicitly stated to The Guardian that financial
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  information was not accessed. Which sounds like
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  good news. Right. So if the hackers didn't get
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  credit card numbers, is this really a catastrophic
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  event? Well, that assumption. that only financial
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  data matters, is exactly the misconception cybercriminals
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  are banking on today. Wait, really? Yeah. In
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  the modern digital economy, context is arguably
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  more valuable than currency. How so? Think about
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  it. Financial theft is an immediate smash and
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  grab. Someone steals your card number, they buy
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  a bunch of electronics online, your bank's algorithms
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  flag the anomaly, your card gets canceled, and
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  you usually get refunded. Right. It is a headache,
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  but it gets fixed. Exactly. The transaction is
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  binary and resolved quickly because, well, fraud
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  mechanisms are built to handle it. Right. The
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  banks fully expect that to happen. But you are
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  saying contextual data theft is a different beast
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  entirely. Far different. Stealing your travel
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  itinerary, knowing exactly when you are arriving,
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  who you are traveling with, and any special requests
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  you made to the front desk. Like asking for a
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  crib or a late check -in. Yes, exactly. That
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  allows for long -term psychological manipulation.
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  They possess the ingredients to craft a scenario
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  where you willingly hand over your financial
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  information yourself. It shifts the attack from
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  a technical breach of a computer system to a
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  psychological breach of the human mind. Wow.
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  That frames that line, anything you may have
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  shared with the accommodation, in a much darker
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  light. It really does. They aren't trying to
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  break into the vault. They are trying to convince
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  you to open the vault for them. Precisely. But
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  if booking .com is this massive tech giant with
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  a robust security budget, how did hackers actually
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  get this incredibly specific data? I mean, they
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  didn't break down booking .com's main server
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  doors, did they? They didn't even try. Really?
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  Yeah. The notifications that went out to customers
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  specifically stated that hackers accessed, quote,
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  certain booking information associated with your
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  reservation. Okay. And that phrasing implies
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  a localized point of access. Ah, the parking
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  garage down the street. Exactly that. The vulnerability
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  lies in the supply chain. Okay. Break that down
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  for me. To understand how this happens, we have
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  to look at how these distributed networks function.
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  Security researchers point out that hackers compromise
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  the individual hotel partner accounts, not the
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  central platform. And a major mechanism for this,
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  which is attributed to a threat group tracked
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  as Storm 1865, is a highly sophisticated phishing
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  technique known as ClickFix. Okay, walk me through
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  ClickFix. How does that actually bypass a hotel's
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  security? Well, picture a front desk manager
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  at an independent hotel. They receive an urgent
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  email. seemingly from Booking .com, or perhaps
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  even a guest, regarding an issue with a reservation.
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  Seems routine enough. Right. So they click a
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  link to view the details. Suddenly, a very legitimate
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  -looking pop -up appears on their screen saying
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  their web browser is out of date. Oh, no. Or
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  maybe that they need an extension to view the
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  document. Yeah. And it prompts them to click
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  a button to fix the issue. Hence, ClickFix. And
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  clicking that button installs the malware. Exactly.
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  It drops an InfoStealer or remote access Trojan
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  directly onto the hotel's computer. Wow. And
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  this isn't necessarily a highly sophisticated
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  nation state cyber weapon destroying the network.
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  What is it then? In many cases, it functions
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  similarly to consumer grade stalkerware. Yeah.
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  peak tattletale, which researchers noted in earlier
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  related incidents. It basically just silently
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  monitors the machine. Wait, let me make sure
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  I'm visualizing this correctly. It's not someone
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  breaking into a digital filing cabinet to steal
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  a massive database file, right? It's more like
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  a hacker installing a tiny invisible camera right
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  over the front desk clerk's shoulder. That is
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  a brilliant way to describe it. Yeah. While the
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  legitimate hotel employee is logged into their
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  secure booking .com administration portal, the
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  malware is secretly snapping screenshots. Or
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  scraping the session data. Exactly. It bypasses
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  two -factor authentication completely because
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  the authorized human user has already done the
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  authenticating. If we connect this to the bigger
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  picture, this is the textbook definition of third
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  -party risk. It really is. In cybersecurity,
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  a system is truly only as secure as its weakest
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  link. Always. I mean, a global platform like
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  Booking .com has had billions of customers over
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  the years. They can build a billion dollar state
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  of the art fortress with biometric scanners and
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  laser grids, but they still have to leave the
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  back window wide open because the gardener needs
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  to get in to water the ferns. That's the perfect
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  way to put it. The platform only functions if
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  the independent hotel partners can actually see
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  who is arriving and what room they booked. Right.
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  Booking .com has to share that data with thousands.
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  of independent businesses ranging from massive
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  luxury chains to a two bedroom bed and breakfast
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  in some rural village. And they can't control
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  their security. No, they cannot completely control
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  the cybersecurity hygiene of that bed and breakfast.
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  They can't stop a tired front desk clerk from
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  falling for a click fix pop up. It is staggering
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  when you think about the attack surface. It isn't
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  just the main corporate servers. It is every
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  single endpoint in a global partner network.
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  Exactly. So now that we understand the mechanics,
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  how the hackers use ClickFix to look over the
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  shoulder of the hotel staff and what they take,
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  which is this rich contextual data, we need to
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  look at the execution. Right. The actual scam.
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  Yeah. How are criminals using this non -financial
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  data right now? Well, this is where the long
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  con pays off. According to the reporting. Shortly
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  after the data was accessed, customers started
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  receiving highly convincing phishing messages
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  via WhatsApp and SMS text messages. Here's where
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  it gets really interesting because this taps
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  directly into our cognitive biases. Absolutely.
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  If you get a text from a random number saying,
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  hey, your account is locked, click here, your
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  brain instantly flags it as spam. Yeah, you just
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  delete it. Right. It lacks context, so it lacks
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  credibility. But these scammers are using the
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  stolen data to bypass your internal spam filter.
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  They really are. They are sending messages that
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  reference your real name, your actual hotel,
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  the precise dates of your stay, and even your
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  internal booking reference numbers. Which is
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  terrifying. I want to highlight a quote from
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  Kevin Knight. He's the CEO of Talion. In the
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  HelpNet Security article, he noted, quote, Stealing
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  financial information isn't the only way attackers
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  can monetize on a breach. Victims are still at
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  risk of phishing. And these communications could
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  be highly tailored, given the attackers know
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  about the previous holiday bookings. So we go
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  back to that scenario of packing for Rome. You
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  get that WhatsApp message about the local city
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  tax requiring a card re -verification. Right.
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  You are in a mild state of panic about losing
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  your room, and every single detail in that message
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  proves to you that they are legitimate. Yep.
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  You are highly likely to click that link. Oh,
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  absolutely. This tactic is known as spear phishing
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  at scale. OK, what does that mean exactly? Well,
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  traditional phishing casts a wide net with a
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  generic message, hoping someone somewhere happens
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  to bank with the institution they are spoofing.
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  Right. Spear phishing, on the other hand, is
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  highly targeted at one individual, usually requiring
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  hours of research by the attacker to gather enough
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  context. But because these hackers scraped the
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  administration portals, they didn't have to do
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  the research. They automated it. Exactly. They
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  generated thousands of highly customized, personalized
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  attacks in an instant. Wow. They hijacked the
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  established trust between you and the accommodation.
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  You trust the hotel. Therefore, you trust the
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  message. And the moment you click that link and
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  type in your credit cards to re -verify, that
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  is when the financial theft finally occurs. Yes.
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  They use the context to acquire the currency.
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  It is a phenomenal, albeit malicious, piece of
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  social engineering. It is. Given the scale of
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  these personalized attacks, who is actually claiming
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  responsibility? And more importantly, how on
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  earth do you protect yourself when the scams
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  are factually accurate? Well, on the attribution
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  front, things are somewhat layered. Okay. The
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  Dubai -based cybersecurity firm Hackmanac noted
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  that a group called Vect claimed responsibility
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  for the breach on the dark web. Vect. Yeah. However,
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  that claim remains entirely unconfirmed. It is
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  quite common for threat actors to claim high
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  -profile breaches just to boost their notoriety,
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  regardless of their actual involvement. But the
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  underlying mechanism, the click -fix phishing
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  targeting the hotels, that is strongly associated
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  with the group tracked as Storm 1865. That is
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  correct. Researchers have tracked Storm 1865,
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  utilizing these specific tactics against the
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  hospitality sector. And what about the response
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  from Booking .com? Well, Booking .com spokesperson
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  Courtney Camp stated to TechCrunch that they
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  noticed the suspicious activity and took action.
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  Crucially, they updated the pin -in numbers for
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  the affected reservations to contain the issue.
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  I have to challenge the effectiveness of that
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  response, though. Sure enough. Is updating a
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  pin -on on the back end really enough? I mean,
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  if the hackers already scraped my phone number,
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  my email, and know exactly where I'm going on
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  vacation next week, changing a pin -on on a portal
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  doesn't put that genie back in the bottle. What's
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  fascinating here is the duality of incident response.
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  From an infrastructure perspective, changing
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  those pins absolutely contains the active threat.
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  It kicks the hackers out of the portal. stopping
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  future back -end access. It basically locks that
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  back window the gardener uses. But from the consumer's
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  perspective, the damage is already done. Yes,
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  unfortunately. The exposure window has closed,
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  but the exploitation window, the period where
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  those stolen details can be used to trick you,
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  is wide open. Right. The updated PIN does absolutely
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  nothing to stop the WhatsApp message from arriving
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  on your phone tomorrow. So how does a traveler
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  spot these scams? If all the details in the message
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  are 100 % accurate, how do we defend ourselves?
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  It requires a fundamental shift in how we handle
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  digital communications. Okay. You have to establish
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  a hard, non -negotiable rule. Never trust an
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  inbound digital message asking for payment, reverification,
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  or sensitive personal details. Just a blanket
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  rule. Yes. It does not matter if the message
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  contains your exact... booking reference, the
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  names of your children, or your flight number.
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  Because we now know definitively that bad actors
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  possess that context. Exactly. The protocol must
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  always be to verify out -of -band. Out -of -band
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  verification, meaning you have to verify the
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  request outside of the channel the message came
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  through. Spot on. If you receive a text, do not
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  reply to the text. Do not click the link in the
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  text. Right. Open up the official app on your
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  phone or type the direct website address into
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  your browser and check your reservation status
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  there. Or take the analog route and just call
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  the hotel directly. Yes. But even then, there
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  is a catch. Oh. Do not call the phone number
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  provided in that suspicious text message. Of
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  course. The attackers will gladly set up a fake
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  call center to answer the phone and assure you
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  the tax needs to be paid. They really think of
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  everything. They do. You have to look up the
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  hotel's public phone number independently on
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  a search engine, dial it yourself, and ask the
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  front desk directly. Just say, hi, I just received
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  a message about a card hold. Is there actually
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  an issue with my reservation? Exactly. And the
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  front desk will almost certainly tell you to
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  ignore the message. You have to manually break
• 14:12
  the chain of trust that the attacker is trying
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  to hijack. You do. So what does this all mean?
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  If we step back and look at the broader implications
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  of the April 2026 Booking .com incident. I think
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  the biggest takeaway is recognizing the true
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  value of our digital footprints. I agree completely.
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  The real currency in cybersecurity today isn't
• 14:33
  a credit card number. It is the context of your
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  life. It is your schedule, your habits, your
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  relationships with third -party vendors. And
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  those fragments of your daily existence are the
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  puzzle pieces hackers use to build a picture
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  so convincing that you willingly bypass your
• 14:49
  own common sense. Which leaves us with a rather
• 14:51
  profound challenge moving forward. A challenge
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  regarding trust itself. Yeah. Consider the concept
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  of zero trust. In enterprise IT, zero trust is
• 15:00
  a security framework that means never assuming
• 15:02
  a device or user is safe just because it is already
• 15:05
  inside the corporate network. Right. Verify everything.
• 15:08
  Exactly. Every single action must be continuously
• 15:11
  verified. Now apply that architecture to humanity.
• 15:14
  As our personal data becomes increasingly scattered
• 15:17
  across thousands of third -party vendors, from
• 15:20
  travel platforms to food delivery apps to medical
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  portals, are we reaching a point where we have
• 15:26
  to assume a state of zero trust in our personal
• 15:29
  lives? That is a heavy concept, a zero -trust
• 15:32
  personal life. Think about what that actually
• 15:34
  feels like. You get a text from your child's
• 15:37
  school containing their actual student ID number.
• 15:40
  You can't trust it. Right. You get an email from
• 15:42
  your doctor's office referencing your specific
• 15:44
  appointment time tomorrow. You can't trust it.
• 15:47
  Because that context is out there. Exactly. If
• 15:50
  every message containing perfectly accurate personal
• 15:52
  context must be treated as a potential scam,
• 15:55
  how does that fundamentally alter the way we
• 15:57
  communicate and trust each other in society?
• 16:00
  That is huge. You are moving from a world where
• 16:02
  context proved authenticity to a world where
• 16:04
  context proves absolutely nothing. That is a
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  chilling but incredibly necessary question to
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  ponder the next time your phone buzzes with a
• 16:12
  seemingly helpful update. We are dealing with
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  adversaries who understand human psychology just
• 16:17
  as well as they understand computer code. It
• 16:20
  is a whole new battlefield. Navigating this landscape,
• 16:23
  understanding where your data lives, how third
• 16:26
  party vendors expose you and how to train yourself
• 16:29
  and your team to spot these sophisticated psychological
• 16:32
  traps. It is not something you can figure out
• 16:35
  in a vacuum. No, you really need a partner who
• 16:38
  understands the architecture of these threats.
• 16:40
  Someone who can secure both the digital infrastructure
• 16:43
  and educate the human element. Absolutely. So
• 16:46
  whether you are managing a small business network,
• 16:48
  evaluating the supply chain risks of your enterprise
• 16:51
  architecture, or just trying to lock down your
• 16:53
  digital life, head over to www .kinsoft .com
• 16:57
  .au to discuss your security and IT needs. They
• 17:01
  really have the expertise to help you build that
• 17:02
  robust digital fortress. And more importantly,
• 17:05
  make sure those back windows stay locked. Thank
• 17:08
  you for joining us today on Tech Talks with Kinsoft,
• 17:10
  and stay safe out there.