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Brightspeed – Crimson Collective Claims 1M+ Records · Tech Talks With Kinsoft

• 0:00
  Imagine waking up tomorrow morning, you know,
• 0:02
  pouring your coffee, casually scrolling through
• 0:04
  your phone, and you see a headline that just
• 0:07
  makes your stomach completely drop. Oh yeah,
• 0:10
  that absolute wave of dread. Right, because you
• 0:12
  find out that your physical home address, your
• 0:15
  personal phone number, and even like specific
• 0:17
  records of when an internet technician visited
• 0:20
  your house might be sitting on the dark web.
• 0:22
  Just being freely traded by cyber criminals.
• 0:25
  Exactly. But here's the truly agonizing part.
• 0:28
  Your Internet provider hasn't actually confirmed
• 0:31
  that a breach even happened. So you're just stuck.
• 0:33
  Right. You are just sitting there in this incredibly
• 0:36
  anxious limbo caught entirely between the shadowy
• 0:40
  hacker groups boast on the Internet and a, you
• 0:43
  know, a very slow moving corporate investigation.
• 0:46
  It is a profoundly unsettling position to find
• 0:49
  yourself in. And yet this isn't some hypothetical
• 0:51
  sci -fi scenario we're dreaming up. No, not at
• 0:53
  all. It is a very real situation currently facing
• 0:56
  potentially over a million people. And it represents
• 1:00
  a massive evolution in how cyber criminals are
• 1:02
  operating today. Welcome to Tech Talks with Kinsoft.
• 1:05
  Today we are acting as your personal guides through
• 1:08
  a stack of recent highly detailed cybersecurity
• 1:10
  reports from eSecurity Planet and Security Week.
• 1:13
  We've got a lot of ground to cover. We really
• 1:15
  do. Okay. Okay, so let's unpack this. We are
• 1:17
  going to examine the unverified yet highly publicized
• 1:20
  claims made recently against the broadband provider
• 1:23
  BrightSpeed. Yeah, that's a fascinating case
• 1:26
  study in modern extortion. It really is. And
• 1:29
  then we are going to trace the shadowy kind of
• 1:33
  domino effect track record. of the group claiming
• 1:35
  responsibility. The Crimson Collective. Which
• 1:38
  is a terrifying group to look into. Completely.
• 1:41
  And finally, we will explore a fundamental shift
• 1:43
  in cybercrime overall. A shift where hackers
• 1:46
  are, well, they're abandoning the old strategy
• 1:48
  of locking up your computer systems and moving
• 1:51
  entirely toward pure, unadulterated extortion
• 1:53
  based solely on stolen data. That shift, that
• 1:56
  is the most critical piece of this whole puzzle.
• 1:58
  Because as an industry, and frankly just as consumers
• 2:01
  who entrust these companies with our personal
• 2:03
  lives, we have to learn how to soberly assess
• 2:06
  these. unverified extortion claims. Right. Without
• 2:09
  just instantly panicking. Exactly. The mechanics
• 2:12
  of these attacks have completely changed, which
• 2:14
  means our reaction to them has to change as well.
• 2:16
  So let's start with the target and the claim.
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  The company currently in the crosshairs is Brightspeed.
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  Right. And for those who might not be familiar
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  with them, they are a major fiber broadband.
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  provider in the U .S. They serve over one million
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  business and home users across 20 states. And
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  they primarily operate in rural and suburban
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  communities, right? Yep. Mostly rural and suburban.
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  So we are talking about a critical piece of infrastructure
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  for a massive number of people who rely on them
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  for their daily connectivity, their remote work,
• 2:50
  running their small businesses, all of it. And
• 2:52
  the timeline of how this unfolded is really crucial
• 2:54
  to understanding this new playbook we mentioned.
• 2:56
  In early January 2026, Bright Speed announced
• 2:59
  they had opened an official investigation into
• 3:01
  a, quote, cybersecurity event. Cybersecurity
• 3:05
  event. Such a beautifully vague corporate phrase.
• 3:09
  It is. But notice the context there. This wasn't
• 3:12
  because their internal alarms were blaring about
• 3:14
  a locked network or offline servers, right? The
• 3:17
  business was still running. OK, so why did they
• 3:19
  announce it? Because on January 4th, the group
• 3:23
  calling itself Crimson Collective took to Telegram.
• 3:26
  Ah, Telegram. I mean, it really has become the
• 3:30
  modern town square for cyber extortionists to
• 3:32
  hold their little press conferences, hasn't it?
• 3:34
  It serves their purposes perfectly, yeah. On
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  Telegram, Crimson Collective publicly claimed
• 3:39
  to have stolen data on more than one million
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  Brightspeed customers. Wow. One million. And
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  they didn't just, you know, type out a threatening
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  text post. They shared screenshots and small
• 3:50
  data samples to act as purported proof of that
• 3:53
  conquest. And looking at our sources, the specific
• 3:56
  data they claim to hold is incredibly extensive.
• 3:59
  Yeah, it's not just emails. No, we are talking
• 4:01
  about full account master records. So this includes
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  names, emails, phone numbers, billing addresses,
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  and physical service addresses, plus all the
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  account metadata. And it gets worse. It does.
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  The group is alleging that customer payment histories
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  and masked payment card details may have also
• 4:17
  been accessed, along with actual appointment
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  and service order records. See, if those claims
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  are true, it's a comprehensive profile of a household
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  or a business. It really is. It's not just a
• 4:28
  digital footprint anymore. It is a physical one.
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  I mean, when you leak physical service addresses
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  and exact technician appointment times, you are
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  bridging the gap between cyber vulnerability
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  and real world physical. security. That is such
• 4:42
  a creepy thought. But, and I want to make sure
• 4:45
  we really emphasize this for anyone following
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  this story, as of mid -January, Brightspeed had
• 4:50
  not confirmed any data exfiltration. Right. That's
• 4:53
  a huge point. They had not confirmed a compromise
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  of their production systems. The claims remained
• 4:57
  entirely unverified. Yes, strictly allegations
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  at this stage. Which brings me to an analogy
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  that kind of helps me wrap my head around the
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  absurdity of this tactic. This feels like a hostage
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  situation where the kidnappers mail a Polaroid
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  to a local news station, but the police haven't
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  even confirmed that anyone is actually missing
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  from their homes yet. Yeah, that's exactly what
• 5:16
  this is. So if the Crimson Collective just claims
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  they have this data, why would a company even
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  publicly respond or acknowledge it before their
• 5:23
  own forensic team confirms it? Because of the
• 5:25
  psychological pressure cooker these groups rely
• 5:27
  on, you have to look at the leverage Crimson
• 5:29
  Collective is trying to manufacture here. OK.
• 5:32
  They didn't quietly email an executive at bright
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  speed and ask for a ransom to keep things quiet.
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  That is the old way of doing things. Right. The
• 5:39
  old behind closed doors shakedown. Exactly. Instead,
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  they sent this supposed proof of possession to
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  independent cybersecurity experts who actively
• 5:48
  monitor the dark web. They posted on Telegram
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  publicly warning that a much larger data sample
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  would. So they are deliberately weaponizing public
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  panic. Precisely. They want the media, the security
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  researchers, and most importantly, the terrified
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  customers to do all the heavy lifting of pressuring
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  the company into a payout. Yep. The goal is to
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  make the noise so absolutely deafening that the
• 6:14
  company feels compelled to pay up just to stop
• 6:16
  the bleeding of their reputation. But practically
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  speaking, I want to play devil's advocate for
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  a second here. Sure. How can a CEO just sit in
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  their hands while their brand is getting dragged
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  all over social media and the news? Because the
• 6:29
  sources note that class action lawsuits followed
• 6:32
  almost immediately after that Telegram post.
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  Yes, they did. Just based on the rumor. I mean,
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  if unverified claims alone trigger massive legal
• 6:40
  action of brand damage, isn't silence from the
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  company just as damaging as the supposed breach?
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  It's a brutal dilemma for sure. But giving in
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  to the panic is exactly what the attackers are
• 6:52
  banking on. This is why it is so critically important
• 6:55
  for organizations and for you listening to this
• 6:57
  to learn how to soberly assess these situations.
• 7:00
  Sober assessment over panic. Always. Because
• 7:02
  attackers exaggerate. They routinely inflate
• 7:05
  the scope of what they've stolen to maximize
• 7:07
  their leverage. We've seen numerous cases where
• 7:10
  a group like recycles old public data from a
• 7:13
  third party breach. Oh, like they just repackage
• 7:16
  old stuff? Exactly. They package it up and claim
• 7:19
  it's a fresh direct compromise of a new target
• 7:21
  company. If a CEO panics and pays out or even
• 7:26
  issues a statement confirming a massive breach
• 7:28
  before forensics are completely done, they might
• 7:30
  be reacting to a complete fabrication. Wow. The
• 7:33
  period between the claim and the confirmation
• 7:35
  requires absolute operational discipline. So
• 7:38
  Brightsby's response of basically saying, we
• 7:41
  are investigating, we take this seriously, but
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  we haven't confirmed it, is really the only viable
• 7:46
  playbook while the IT team is digging through
• 7:48
  the logs. It's the only responsible move, yes.
• 7:51
  But that leads us to a really important question.
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  If threat actors bluff so frequently, why is
• 7:56
  the cybersecurity world taking the Crimson Collective's
• 7:59
  claims so seriously in the first place? Why assume
• 8:02
  there's fire behind all this smoke? Well, the
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  concern stems from their resume. This aggressive,
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  highly public pressure tactic isn't happening
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  in a vacuum. It is the signature move of a group
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  with a proven, very recent, and incredibly damaging
• 8:17
  track record. And that track record is just a
• 8:19
  history of terrifying domino effects. Yeah, let's
• 8:21
  look at the timeline. Let's trace this back just
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  a few months to October 2025. Crimson Collective
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  pulled off a massive breach of a Red Hat GitLab
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  instance. Our sources show they exfiltrated roughly
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  570 gigabytes of data across 28 ,000 private
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  internal development repositories. And they primarily
• 8:41
  hit Red Hat's consulting division. And pulling
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  that volume of data out of a highly sophisticated
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  enterprise environment like Red Hat, that is
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  a significant technical feat. But wait, I have
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  to push back on the severity of this for a second.
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  Okay. Red Hat is famously known for open source
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  software development. If these GitLab repositories
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  are basically just software code, why is this
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  level of theft considered such a devastating
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  blow? It's not like they stole a giant database
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  of Social Security numbers. That assumption is
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  exactly what makes targeting source code so insidious.
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  How so? The danger isn't necessarily the code
• 9:16
  itself. It is the supply chain vulnerability
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  it creates. We have to look at the mechanics
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  of what is actually inside those repositories.
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  Right, because it was the consulting division.
• 9:25
  Exactly. These aren't public open source tools.
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  These repositories often contain the literal
• 9:30
  architecture of other companies' networks. Oh,
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  I see. They hold configuration files, deployment
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  scripts, and critically hard -coded credentials
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  or API keys that are meant to integrate different
• 9:41
  corporate environments together. Oh, wow. Okay,
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  so to use an analogy, it's not like the thieves
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  broke into a parking garage and stole a bunch
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  of cars. It's like they broke into the valet
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  stand, smashed open the master lockbox. and stole
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  the keys to every single car that happens to
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  be parked there. That is the absolute perfect
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  way to visualize it. You now have the keys to
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  environments you weren't even originally targeting.
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  That's terrifying. And we saw the real world
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  fallout of this valet key theft almost immediately.
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  In December 2025, just two months after the Red
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  Hat breach, the Japanese automaker Nissan had
• 10:17
  to come forward. Right, the Nissan breach. They
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  confirmed that the personal information of 21
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  ,000 of their Japanese customers was exposed,
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  and the root cause. It was specifically traced
• 10:27
  back to those compromised Red Hat repositories.
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  So they didn't hack Nissan directly at first.
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  Nope. The Crimson Collective stole from Red Hat,
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  and the credentials hidden within that stolen
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  data provided the direct avenue to break into
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  Nissan's customer database. That is the domino
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  effect in action right there. Yeah. You hack
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  Company A, not because you want Company A's data,
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  but to get the leverage or the access keys to
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  hit Company B, C, and D. Exactly. And our sources
• 10:54
  show that Crimson Collective's tactics are only
• 10:57
  escalating, and they're expanding their network
• 11:00
  to do it. They don't work in isolation anymore.
• 11:02
  No. they're building alliances. Yeah, they partnered
• 11:04
  up with the Scattered Labs as Hunters Collective.
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  They utilized the Shiny Hunters leak site to
• 11:08
  amplify their extortion threats. They're building
• 11:10
  a genuine syndicate. Which raises an important
• 11:12
  point about their technical capabilities. Security
• 11:15
  researchers have linked this specific group to
• 11:18
  highly sophisticated attacks on Amazon Web Services
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  or AWS environments. AWS is huge. Massive. Yeah.
• 11:26
  And the mechanism of how they operate within
• 11:27
  AWS is deeply concerning. They aren't just sending
• 11:31
  phishing emails hoping an employee clicks a bad
• 11:33
  link. They are actively exploiting exposed credentials
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  to create rogue identity and access management
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  or IAM accounts. Wait, let me stop you there
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  because I want to make sure I understand the
• 11:44
  mechanics of this. How are they creating rogue
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  admin accounts without tripping every single
• 11:50
  security alarm in the building? That's sneaky.
• 11:52
  I mean, if I try to install an unapproved app
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  on my work laptop, my IT department knows in
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  about three seconds. How does a hacker secretly
• 12:01
  create an entire administrator account? It comes
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  down to manipulating permission policies and
• 12:07
  hiding within the noise of automated systems.
• 12:09
  Okay. They often don't create an account that
• 12:12
  looks like a human user like, you know, John
• 12:14
  in accounting. Instead, they target non -human
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  identities, what we call service accounts. Service
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  accounts. Yeah. These are accounts used by applications
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  to talk to other applications, which often have
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  incredibly high privileges, but just aren't monitored
• 12:27
  the same way human logins are. Oh, because it's
• 12:29
  just software talking to software. Exactly. So
• 12:32
  by exploiting misconfigurations, they grant these
• 12:35
  service accounts hidden permissions, they establish
• 12:38
  persistent invisible backdoors inside the cloud
• 12:41
  environment, escalate their privileges quietly,
• 12:44
  and then systematically steal data at scale,
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  entirely blending in with normal automated cloud
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  traffic. So they're setting up their own administrative
• 12:52
  access right under the nose of the company's
• 12:55
  IT department, disguised as routine software
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  communication. Precisely. But you know what stands
• 13:00
  out to me the most about all of these incidents?
• 13:03
  The AWS attacks, the Red Hat supply chain breach,
• 13:07
  the alleged BraitSpeed incident. None of them
• 13:10
  involve ransomware in the traditional sense.
• 13:12
  No, they don't. It is a striking pattern, and
• 13:14
  it really defines the modern threat landscape.
• 13:17
  I mean, no one's computers were locked. There
• 13:19
  were no encrypted hard drives with a red skull
• 13:21
  and crossbones on the screen demanding Bitcoin
• 13:23
  just to turn the servers back on. Right. And
• 13:26
  that leads us directly into what our sources
• 13:28
  identify as the data centric extortion era. We
• 13:31
  are witnessing a fundamental paradigm shift in
• 13:34
  the business model of cybercrime. It's wild.
• 13:37
  For years, the absolute gold standard for threat
• 13:40
  actors was encryption based ransomware. The playbook
• 13:44
  was simple. You break in, you encrypt the servers,
• 13:47
  you bring the company's daily operations to a
• 13:49
  grinding halt, and you demand a massive ransom
• 13:53
  in exchange for the decryption key. Right. But
• 13:56
  that modder has become increasingly difficult,
• 13:59
  expensive, and risky for the attackers to maintain,
• 14:02
  hasn't it? Extremely. Here's where it gets really
• 14:04
  interesting to me. Why go through all the trouble
• 14:07
  of building and deploying complex encryption
• 14:09
  malware? It's incredibly noisy. It trips antivirus
• 14:13
  and behavioral alarms. It requires a massive
• 14:15
  amount of technical overhead to maintain. And
• 14:17
  honestly, half the time the decryptor tools the
• 14:20
  hackers give you don't even work properly anyway.
• 14:22
  Right, which completely ruins their quote unquote
• 14:24
  reputation as reliable extortionists. So they're
• 14:28
  just abandoning the encryption part entirely.
• 14:30
  It is purely a matter of return on investment.
• 14:32
  Why build out complex encryption software when
• 14:34
  you can just quietly steal the most sensitive
• 14:36
  data you can find? They don't want the hassle
• 14:39
  of locking the networks anymore. They just use
• 14:42
  the threat of public disclosure or selling that
• 14:45
  data to other criminals. as their sole point
• 14:48
  of leverage. It's like a burglar realizing they
• 14:51
  don't need to go through the effort of changing
• 14:52
  the deadbolts on your house to keep you out.
• 14:55
  They just need to sneak in through an open window,
• 14:57
  steal your private diary, and then threaten to
• 15:00
  stand on the sidewalk and read it through a megaphone
• 15:02
  to your entire neighborhood unless you pay them.
• 15:05
  That's exactly it. The leverage isn't denying
• 15:07
  you access to your own house. The leverage is
• 15:10
  entirely based on public humiliation, brand destruction,
• 15:14
  and the inevitable regulatory fines. That analogy
• 15:17
  perfectly captures the shift in leverage. And
• 15:20
  because the attackers are explicitly targeting
• 15:22
  identities and cloud infrastructure to steal
• 15:24
  that diary rather than trying to break the house
• 15:27
  itself, our entire defensive posture has to change.
• 15:30
  Because the old tools don't work. Right. You
• 15:33
  can't fight data extortion with the same tools
• 15:35
  you use to fight ransomware. The sources we are
• 15:37
  looking at outline a defense strategy built heavily
• 15:40
  on zero trust principles. I hear zero trust.
• 15:44
  thrown around a lot as an industry buzzword.
• 15:46
  But let me wrestle with what that actually means
• 15:48
  practically. So zero trust isn't just a bigger,
• 15:51
  better firewall. No, not at all. If I'm understanding
• 15:54
  this right, you're treating the inside of your
• 15:57
  network as if it's already compromised. Every
• 15:59
  single time a user or an application tries to
• 16:03
  access a file, you check their ID at the door.
• 16:06
  It's like turning every single file folder into
• 16:09
  a heavily guarded border crossing. You've hit
• 16:11
  the nail on the head. Because groups like Crimson
• 16:14
  Collective are using legitimate, albeit stolen
• 16:16
  or manipulated, credentials like those AWS service
• 16:20
  accounts we discussed, you cannot rely on a strong
• 16:22
  perimeter defense. Right, because they already
• 16:24
  have the key. Exactly. Once they are inside,
• 16:27
  they look like they belong there. Therefore,
• 16:29
  companies must prioritize hardening their IAM
• 16:31
  configurations. Okay, so strictly enforcing least
• 16:34
  privilege access. Yes. A marketing intern's account.
• 16:38
  or an automated billing script should absolutely
• 16:40
  never have the technical permissions to even
• 16:42
  view the core customer database, let alone download
• 16:46
  it. And you have to constantly rotate those credentials
• 16:49
  to render stolen valet keys useless. The sources
• 16:52
  also talk a lot about data loss prevention, or
• 16:55
  DLP, and egress controls. Oh, yes, crucial. If
• 16:59
  the attacker's entire business model is to exfiltrate
• 17:02
  data -like, to physically copy it and move it
• 17:05
  out of your network to their own servers. You
• 17:07
  have to watch the exit doors just as closely,
• 17:10
  if not more closely, than the entrance. Exactly.
• 17:13
  DLP tools act like a security guard checking
• 17:15
  bags on the way out of the building. If a cloud
• 17:18
  server that normally sends say a few megabytes
• 17:20
  of routine telemetry data a day suddenly tries
• 17:23
  to export 500 gigabytes of compressed customer
• 17:25
  records to an unknown IP address in another country,
• 17:28
  the egress controls need to be configured to
• 17:30
  automatically sever that connection. Cut it off
• 17:32
  immediately. But preventing the theft is only
• 17:34
  half the battle. The sources heavily emphasize
• 17:37
  that visibility is equally critical. You need
• 17:39
  to maintain immutable, centralized logs. Immutable,
• 17:42
  meaning they are mathematically locked. They
• 17:44
  cannot be altered, edited, or deleted, not even
• 17:48
  by someone holding an administrator account.
• 17:50
  Right. But why is that specific feature the silver
• 17:55
  bullet? in this scenario remember our discussion
• 17:58
  earlier about soberly assessing unverified claims
• 18:01
  and bluffs yeah avoiding the panic exactly when
• 18:04
  a group like crimson collective posts on telegram
• 18:06
  and says we just stole 1 million customer records
• 18:09
  you need to know immediately unequivocally if
• 18:13
  they are lying ah i see If your access logs are
• 18:16
  centralized and immutable, your forensics team
• 18:19
  can look at the exact timeline and say, no, it
• 18:21
  is mathematically impossible for that volume
• 18:23
  of data to have left our network in that time
• 18:25
  frame. Or conversely, yes, we see the exact rogue
• 18:29
  IAM account they used and we know exactly what
• 18:32
  they took. Wow. OK. Without those immutable logs,
• 18:34
  you are flying completely blind during a massive
• 18:37
  crisis, which leaves right back to panic. Which
• 18:39
  brings us to the human element of this crisis
• 18:41
  management. For you, the listener, or for any
• 18:44
  company leader who might face this scenario,
• 18:46
  how do you actually prepare for the PR nightmare
• 18:50
  of an extortion -driven breach? Because if the
• 18:54
  servers are never locked, it's not just an IT
• 18:56
  problem anymore. That is the core vulnerability
• 18:58
  most companies haven't addressed. IT recovery,
• 19:01
  meaning restoring systems from offline backups,
• 19:04
  isn't enough anymore because your systems were
• 19:06
  never down in the first place. The business kept
• 19:09
  running while the data was stolen. Exactly. Companies
• 19:11
  must fundamentally update their incident response
• 19:13
  plans. The sources recommend tabletop exercises,
• 19:17
  which are highly realistic role -playing simulations
• 19:19
  for the executive team. But these exercises must
• 19:23
  focus entirely on data disclosure. Right. So
• 19:26
  the simulation shouldn't be the main servers
• 19:28
  are encrypted and offline. Yeah. The simulation
• 19:30
  should be a hacker just tweeted a screenshot
• 19:33
  of our VIP customer database and is demanding
• 19:35
  $5 million. The press is calling. Go. Precisely.
• 19:39
  Who drafts the regulatory response? Which legal
• 19:43
  team is on standby? How do we communicate with
• 19:46
  customers to protect them before the panic sets
• 19:48
  in? And who handles the legal ramifications if
• 19:51
  class action lawsuits are filed based purely
• 19:53
  on a rumor? Yes, the corporate response has to
• 19:56
  be as coordinated, rapid, and sophisticated as
• 19:59
  the attack itself. So what does this all mean
• 20:01
  for the situation at hand? To summarize, we are
• 20:05
  all currently in a waiting game. We have to wait
• 20:08
  for Bright Speed's internal investigation to
• 20:10
  conclude. We do. We have to wait and see if the
• 20:13
  Crimson Collective's claim of holding one million
• 20:15
  customer records is actually true, or if it is
• 20:18
  a highly calculated recycled bluff designed to
• 20:21
  force a quick payout. But whether verified or
• 20:23
  not, the mechanics of this incident perfectly
• 20:26
  encapsulate the terrifying shift toward pure
• 20:28
  data -centric extortion. It absolutely does.
• 20:31
  And if we follow the logic of this evolution,
• 20:33
  it leaves us with a rather chilling path forward.
• 20:35
  Chilling how? Well, if threat actors are completely
• 20:38
  moving away from extorting the company to purely
• 20:41
  leveraging the stolen data, what happens when
• 20:44
  they realize they can just cut out the corporate
• 20:46
  middleman entirely? Wait, what do you mean cut
• 20:49
  the company out of the extortion? Think about
• 20:51
  the highly specific metadata that Crimson Collective
• 20:54
  claimed to have stolen from Brightspeed. OK.
• 20:57
  It wasn't just generic names and emails. It was
• 20:59
  session IDs. It was specific service appointment
• 21:02
  times. What is stopping these syndicates from
• 21:05
  automating their extortion? Oh, no. Imagine them
• 21:08
  using artificial intelligence to parse that massive
• 21:11
  database of metadata and automatically send highly
• 21:14
  convincing, deeply personalized ransom demands
• 21:17
  directly to one million individual users. A text
• 21:21
  message that says, we know you have an Internet
• 21:23
  service appointment at your home at 2 p .m. on
• 21:25
  Thursday. Pay us $50 in Bitcoin or we release
• 21:29
  your browsing session IDs and payment history
• 21:31
  to everyone in your contact list. That is insane.
• 21:34
  No corporate negotiations, no million dollar
• 21:37
  demands to a CEO. Just one million micro extortions
• 21:42
  executed automatically and simultaneously. That
• 21:45
  is the next logical step in data centric cybercrime.
• 21:48
  That is horrifying. And it really brings us back
• 21:51
  to that opening thought. The kidnappers Polaroid
• 21:54
  mailed to the news station. Except in this near
• 21:56
  future. The burglar doesn't just read your diary
• 21:59
  with a megaphone to the neighborhood. They use
• 22:01
  an automated system to call every single person
• 22:03
  you know simultaneously, demanding a few dollars
• 22:06
  from you to stay quiet. It's a completely different
• 22:09
  scale of threat. The next time you see a headline
• 22:11
  about a massive data breach, you'll know exactly
• 22:14
  what's happening behind the scenes. You won't
• 22:15
  just see a company under attack. You'll recognize
• 22:17
  the bluffs, the zero trust failures, and this
• 22:20
  inevitable shift toward data extortion. It makes
• 22:23
  the need for proactive zero trust defense not
• 22:26
  just a corporate priority, but an absolute societal
• 22:29
  necessity. It requires constant vigilance. We
• 22:33
  have to secure that data before the megaphone
• 22:35
  is ever picked up. Absolutely. And that is exactly
• 22:38
  why we explore these sources, so you aren't caught
• 22:40
  off guard when the tactics change. If you are
• 22:42
  looking to harden your own systems against these
• 22:44
  modern threats, visit www .kinsoft .com .au to
• 22:48
  discuss your security and IT needs. Thank you
• 22:51
  for joining us on Tech Talks with Kinsoft. We
• 22:53
  hope this gives you a clearer lens through which
• 22:54
  to view the headlines. Stay safe out there, keep
• 22:57
  an eye on your data, and we will catch you on
• 22:59
  the next one.