Latest / Logosofia no Dia a Dia / Where Left and Right Actually Come From
Transcript
- [Prompt] custom: We've talked in recent episodes about some of the fundamental definitions we use to anchor our polit | Hosts: corn, herman [Response] Corn: Daniel sent us this one, and it's the kind of question that sounds simple until you actually try to answer it. He wants to know where the left-right political spectrum even came from in the first place — why left means liberal and right means conservative. But the real question he's digging into is whether centrism has an actual intellectual foundation, a defined set of values the way liberalism and conservatism do, or whether it's just a reactive position that defines itself by what it's not. And across different political systems, what actually anchors someone to calling themselves a centrist when they probably hold a mix of progressive and conservative views anyway? Herman: The origin story of left and right is one of those things where the literal answer is almost absurdly specific. It comes from a single room in seventeen eighty-nine. The French Estates-General convened that year, and the seating arrangement in the National Assembly had nobles sitting to the king's right — the place of honor — and commoners, the Third Estate, sitting to his left. That seating chart became shorthand. Supporters of the ancien régime sat right, advocates for radical change sat left. Within a few years, newspapers were using "left" and "right" as political labels, and it just stuck. Corn: The entire global shorthand for political identity is basically a seating chart from a meeting that happened two hundred and thirty-some years ago. That's almost too perfect. Herman: It really is. And what's wild is how quickly the terms migrated. By the nineteenth century, "left" had come to mean secular, egalitarian, pro-state intervention in the economy, while "right" meant hierarchical, traditional, pro-monarchy or pro-market. But here's the thing — the content of those labels has shifted so dramatically that a French right-winger in eighteen twenty was a monarchist who wanted to restore the Bourbon kings, while a right-winger today in the same country is more likely a nationalist populist. Same word, completely different worldview. Corn: Which raises the question of why the spectrum persists at all. If the labels keep getting repainted, why do we keep using the same wall? Herman: That's exactly the puzzle. And part of the answer is the Cold War. The left-right axis mapped almost perfectly onto communism versus capitalism, and that compression flattened a huge amount of local political complexity into a single dimension. Suddenly, every political conflict anywhere in the world could be read through this lens — are you with the Soviets or with the Americans? It was a brutally reductive way to understand politics, but it was incredibly useful for the superpowers and for the media covering them. Corn: The spectrum survived not because it's accurate, but because it was convenient for a forty-year geopolitical standoff. Herman: And political scientists have been arguing about this ever since. Anthony Downs published his spatial model of voting in nineteen fifty-seven, and it formalized the idea that voters pick the party closest to them on a single left-right dimension. It's elegant, it's mathematically tractable, and it's probably wrong about how most voters actually think. Corn: Walk me through why it's wrong. Because the spatial model sounds intuitive — I figure out where I stand, I look at the parties, I pick the closest one. Herman: It assumes voters can place themselves and all the parties on the same scale. But that breaks down the moment parties start redefining what left and right mean. If one party says "left" means economic redistribution and another says "left" means cultural progressivism, you're not actually comparing positions on the same dimension. It's like trying to measure distance when both ends of the ruler keep moving. Corn: That's before you even get to the problem of single-axis thinking. Pinochet's Chile — economically right-wing, free-market, Chicago Boys, the whole thing. Politically authoritarian, disappeared thousands of people. Where does that land on a left-right line? It doesn't. The axis can't hold it. Herman: Most political scientists now use multi-dimensional models — economic left-right, social liberal-conservative, authoritarian-libertarian — because a single axis just can't capture how voters actually form preferences. But here's the thing: even though the model is flawed, voters still use the labels. And the labels still structure political competition. So the spectrum is a useful fiction, but it's a fiction that has real power. Corn: Which brings us to the people standing in the middle of this fiction. If the left-right axis is a map that doesn't quite match the territory, what does it mean to say you're a centrist? Are you claiming to stand at the midpoint of a line that doesn't actually exist? Herman: That's the question. And there are really two ways to answer it. One is that centrism is just a spatial position — you're wherever the two extremes aren't. The other is that centrism is a positive ideology with its own philosophical commitments. And the history of centrist thought is basically a tug-of-war between those two definitions. Corn: Let's start with the spatial version, because that's what most people probably mean when they say centrist. I'm not on the left, I'm not on the right, I'm in the middle. Herman: The problem with that definition is that the middle moves. Data from the Comparative Manifesto Project shows that the median voter position in the US and the UK has remained relatively stable since nineteen eighty, but party platforms have diverged significantly. So the "center" isn't a fixed point — it's the gap between two moving poles. If the left moves further left and the right moves further right, the center expands, but it's not because centrists changed their minds. It's because the extremes evacuated the space. Corn: The center is defined by what it's not. It's the negative space of politics. Herman: That's one way to put it. And that's exactly the critique that radical centrists make of conventional centrism. They argue that if centrism is just "not left, not right," it's intellectually empty. It's a mood, not a philosophy. Corn: Which is a pretty devastating critique when you think about it. Conservatism has Burke and Hayek and a whole tradition of thought about tradition, authority, and markets. Liberalism has Locke and Rawls and centuries of argument about rights and justice. What's the equivalent for centrism? Herman: The most serious attempt to build a positive centrist ideology was the Third Way movement of the nineteen nineties. Tony Blair, Bill Clinton, Gerhard Schröder — they all explicitly rejected both old-left state socialism and new-right laissez-faire conservatism. The intellectual architect was Anthony Giddens, a British sociologist who published "The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy" in nineteen ninety-eight. The core idea was that you could have market-friendly economics combined with social liberalism. You didn't have to choose between economic growth and social justice. Corn: For a while, it worked electorally. Blair won three elections, Clinton won two. But was it a coherent philosophy or just a triangulation strategy? Herman: That's the debate. The Third Way's defenders say it was a genuine synthesis — take the best of both traditions and discard the dogmas. Its critics say it was just a branding exercise for moving right on economics while staying left on social issues to hold together a winning coalition. And the critics have a point. Once the financial crisis hit in two thousand eight, the Third Way consensus collapsed pretty quickly. It turned out that "market-friendly economics" didn't have a great answer for what happens when the markets blow up. Corn: The most successful centrist political movement of the last fifty years turned out to be a fair-weather philosophy. It worked when the economy was growing and fell apart when it wasn't. Herman: That's part of a broader problem for centrism as a positive ideology. There's a more recent intellectual movement called radical centrism — sometimes just "the radical center" — that tries to address this. Key figures include John Avlon, who wrote "Independent Nation" in two thousand four, and Mark Satin, who wrote "Radical Middle" the same year. Their argument is that the center shouldn't be about compromise or splitting the difference. It should be about synthesis — taking the best ideas from left and right while rejecting the dogmas of both. Corn: What does that actually look like in policy terms? Herman: It varies, but the common threads tend to be: fiscal responsibility combined with social liberalism, strong civil liberties, pro-market but with robust safety nets, pro-immigration, pro-trade, internationalist in foreign policy. The radical centrist is basically saying: I want the economic dynamism of the right and the social compassion of the left, and I don't see why I should have to pick one. Corn: Which sounds great in theory. But the weakness of the radical center, at least as a political movement, is that it's much better at critiquing extremes than at proposing concrete, distinctive policies that you couldn't also find in the moderate wings of the major parties. Herman: That's exactly the problem. If your platform is "we take the good parts of both sides," it's hard to explain why voters shouldn't just pick the moderate Democrat or the moderate Republican instead of a third-party centrist. The radical center has produced some interesting think-tank papers and a shelf of books, but it hasn't produced a durable political movement anywhere in the Anglosphere. Corn: That might be because of who actually identifies as a centrist. There's some interesting data on this. Pew Research Center did a big study on political typology, and self-identified centrists in the US are less likely to follow political news, less likely to have strong opinions on specific policies, and more likely to say "both sides are equally to blame" for political dysfunction. Herman: Right, the twenty twenty-five Pew data. And this is where the psychology of centrism gets uncomfortable for people who want it to be a serious ideology. If the average centrist is defined less by positive commitments and more by disengagement and a pox-on-both-houses sentiment, then centrism as an identity is closer to a rejection of partisan conflict than to a coherent worldview. Corn: Which doesn't mean centrists are wrong to be frustrated. But frustration isn't a platform. Herman: And there's a fascinating study from the European Journal of Political Research that complicates this picture. It found that voters who self-identify as centrist score higher on cognitive flexibility and lower on authoritarianism than voters at either extreme. So there might be something psychologically distinct about centrists — they're not just disengaged, they're actually more comfortable with ambiguity and less drawn to rigid ideological systems. Corn: That's a more flattering portrait. The centrist as the person who can hold two contradictory ideas at once, who doesn't need the world to be simple. Herman: It aligns with some of the radical centrist self-conception. But here's the problem: cognitive flexibility is great for understanding complex problems. It's terrible for mobilizing voters and winning elections. Politics runs on clarity and contrast. "It's complicated" is not a winning slogan. Corn: There's a structural tension between the psychological profile of the centrist and the demands of democratic politics. Herman: That tension plays out differently depending on the political system. This is where the cross-national comparison gets really interesting. In multi-party systems like Germany or the Netherlands, centrism can be a concrete political position with a clear platform. Take the German Free Democratic Party — the FDP. They've been a centrist coalition partner in multiple governments since nineteen forty-nine, and they have a consistent ideological identity: economic liberalism, civil liberties, pro-European. They're not just "not left, not right." They have a positive vision of a market-oriented, liberty-focused society. Corn: In a multi-party system, you can actually build a party around centrist principles and govern with it. Herman: The FDP has been in government more often than almost any other German party because they're willing to form coalitions with either the center-right CDU or the center-left SPD. Their centrism is a bargaining position that gives them leverage. In a two-party system like the US or the UK, centrism doesn't work that way. There's no centrist party that can play kingmaker. Centrists have to pick a side, and their influence is limited to pulling one of the major parties toward the middle during primaries. Corn: Which explains why "centrist" means something totally different in Berlin than it does in Washington. In Berlin, it's a party label with a platform. In Washington, it's a vibe. Herman: That's good. And it gets at something important about how the Overton window shapes centrism. The Overton window is the range of policies that are considered politically acceptable at a given time. And centrists don't define that window — they occupy whatever space is left after the extremes have shifted it. Corn: Give me an example. Herman: In nineteen ninety, a US politician supporting gay marriage was firmly on the left. By twenty fifteen, supporting gay marriage was the centrist position, and opposing it had become the extreme. The center followed the Overton window. It didn't lead it. Centrists didn't drive that shift — activists and social movements did, and then the center recalibrated to the new normal. Corn: Centrism is always playing catch-up. It's the last position to change, not the first. Herman: That's the structural weakness of centrism as a political force. If you define yourself by the midpoint between two extremes, you're always reactive. You can't set the agenda. You can only respond to the agenda that the fringes have already set. Corn: Which brings us back to Daniel's question about what anchors someone to the identity of being a centrist. If you're a voter who holds a mix of progressive and conservative views — which is most people, honestly — what makes you call yourself a centrist rather than a moderate liberal or a moderate conservative? Herman: I think there are a few different things going on. One is purely temperamental. Some people are just constitutionally averse to picking a team. They don't want to be associated with the baggage of either party or either ideological tradition, even if their actual policy views tilt consistently in one direction. Corn: The "I don't like labels" voter. Herman: And that's a perfectly coherent personal stance, but it's not a political philosophy. The second thing is what political scientists call negative partisanship. A lot of self-identified centrists aren't so much for anything as they are against the excesses of both sides. They look at the left and see illiberal campus activism and fiscal recklessness. They look at the right and see populist nationalism and climate denial. And they define themselves in opposition to both. Corn: It's a double negative. Not that, and also not that. Herman: The third thing, which is maybe the most interesting, is that some centrists genuinely do have a positive vision — it's just that the vision doesn't map neatly onto the existing party system. They might believe in free markets and open borders and a strong social safety net and aggressive climate action. That bundle of views doesn't have a natural home in either the Democratic or Republican coalition in the US, so they end up calling themselves centrists by default. Corn: The orphaned voter. Herman: And there are a lot of them. The question is whether they can ever cohere into a political force, or whether they're permanently scattered across the two parties, pulling in different directions. Corn: What's your read on that? Herman: I'm skeptical, honestly. The structural pressures in a two-party system are so strong. The primary system rewards ideological purity, not synthesis. The media environment rewards conflict, not nuance. And the fundraising model rewards clear enemies, not complicated friends. Centrism as a political movement is swimming against all of those currents. Corn: Yet the median voter is still somewhere near the middle. The Comparative Manifesto Project data you mentioned — the median hasn't moved much even as the parties have polarized. So there's this huge gap between where the voters are and where the parties are. Herman: Which is why you get these periodic centrist eruptions — Ross Perot in the nineties, Emmanuel Macron in France, the Liberal Democrats briefly surging in the UK before collapsing again. There's clearly a demand for something between the poles. But sustaining it organizationally is incredibly hard. Corn: Macron is an interesting case, actually. He explicitly ran as neither left nor right — "en même temps," at the same time. And he won. But his movement has struggled to build a durable party structure beyond his personal brand. Herman: That's the centrist dilemma in a nutshell. You can win once with a charismatic figure who transcends the old divisions. But building an institution that outlasts the founder requires a positive ideology, not just a rejection of the alternatives. And centrism has never quite managed to articulate one that's both coherent and distinctive. Corn: Let me push on that a little. The most cogent centrist thinkers — Avlon, Satin, Giddens — they all argue that centrism does have a positive vision. It's not just moderation. It's a specific theory of how markets and states should interact: markets for growth and efficiency, states for equity and public goods, and a strong liberal commitment to individual rights and open societies. That's not nothing. Herman: No, it's not nothing. And I should be fair to that tradition. Giddens in particular was making a serious intellectual argument. He was saying that the old left was too attached to state ownership and the old right was too attached to the idea that markets solve everything, and both were wrong. The Third Way was supposed to be a new synthesis for a post-industrial economy where the old class divisions didn't apply anymore. Corn: The synthesis turned out to be fragile. Herman: Because it depended on conditions that didn't last. The Third Way worked in the nineties because globalization was delivering growth, the Cold War was over, and there was a sense that liberal democracy had won. Then came the financial crisis, the rise of China, populist backlash, immigration crises, and suddenly the Third Way looked less like a synthesis and more like a bet on a world that no longer existed. Corn: Centrism's intellectual foundation turns out to be historically contingent. It makes sense under certain conditions and falls apart when those conditions change. Herman: Which is true of every ideology, to be fair. Conservatism and liberalism have also evolved dramatically in response to historical events. The difference is that they've had centuries to build intellectual traditions, institutions, and constituencies that can weather those changes. Centrism is always starting from scratch. Corn: There's another dimension here that Daniel's question points toward. In a lot of countries, the left-right axis isn't even the main cleavage. In India, the dominant political division is about caste and religious identity, not economic left versus right. In Brazil, it's about class and region. In Israel, it's about security and religion. The spectrum maps poorly onto a lot of the world's actual political conflicts. Herman: That's a really important point. The left-right spectrum is a European invention that got globalized through colonialism and the Cold War, but it was never a perfect fit for most places. And when you try to force a country's politics onto that axis, you end up with absurdities. Is the BJP in India left or right? It's economically somewhat market-oriented but culturally nationalist and pro-Hindu. That doesn't land neatly anywhere on the European spectrum. Corn: Centrism in those contexts means something totally different. A centrist in India isn't splitting the difference between socialism and capitalism. They're navigating between Hindu nationalism and secular multiculturalism. Herman: Which means that when we talk about centrism, we have to ask: centrist relative to what? The answer reveals whether the speaker is using it as a substantive label or just as a rhetorical move to position themselves as the reasonable adult in the room against supposedly extreme opponents. Corn: That's a useful filter. When a politician calls themselves a centrist, are they making a claim about their policy platform, or are they making a claim about their temperament? Herman: Most of the time, it's temperament. "I'm the reasonable one. Those other people are ideologues." It's a positioning strategy, not a policy agenda. Corn: Which is why it drives actual ideologues crazy. If your whole political identity is built on a set of principles, and someone else comes along and says "I'm above all that, I just do what works," it feels like a refusal to engage. Herman: Sometimes it is a refusal to engage. The Pew data on centrist disengagement suggests that for a lot of people, centrism is a way of opting out of political conflict, not a way of resolving it. Corn: Where does that leave us? If someone listening identifies as a centrist, what should they ask themselves to figure out whether their centrism is substantive or just reactive? Herman: I think there are three questions. First: do I have positive commitments, or am I just rejecting the available options? If you can't articulate what you're for, only what you're against, that's reactive centrism. Second: if the Overton window shifted, would my positions shift with it? If the answer is yes, you're not anchored to principles — you're anchored to the midpoint of whatever the current debate happens to be. And third: can I name a policy that is distinctively centrist, not just a compromise between left and right positions? If you can't, your centrism might just be moderation, not an ideology. Corn: That third one is tough. What's a distinctively centrist policy? Herman: A carbon tax with a dividend paid directly to citizens. That's not left-wing — the left tends to prefer regulation and green industrial policy. It's not right-wing — the right tends to prefer doing nothing or subsidizing fossil fuels. It's a market-based solution to a collective problem that also addresses equity concerns. That's a centrist idea. Corn: It's one that has almost no political constituency in the US, despite being popular with economists across the spectrum. Herman: Which tells you something about the gap between centrist ideas and centrist political power. The ideas exist. The constituency for them is diffuse and unorganized. Corn: The final question, and I think this is where Daniel was pointing: if the Overton window keeps shifting and the center follows, is there any stable definition of centrism, or is it always a temporary equilibrium between moving poles? Herman: I think it's always temporary. The center is a moving target because the extremes keep redefining what's extreme. And as AI-generated political content and algorithmic polarization accelerate, the extremes get louder and more visible, which makes the center even harder to define. You're trying to find the midpoint between two points that are themselves being pulled further apart by forces that didn't exist twenty years ago. Corn: Centrism as a meaningful identity might actually get harder to sustain, not easier, as polarization increases. Herman: That's my worry. The more polarized the environment, the more pressure there is to pick a side. The center becomes not a comfortable home but an exposed position — you get shot at from both directions. Corn: Which is a pretty bleak prospect for anyone who thinks the truth is usually somewhere in the messy middle. Herman: But I'll end with this: the fact that centrism is hard to define and hard to sustain doesn't mean it's worthless. The cognitive flexibility that the European Journal of Political Research study identified — the willingness to hold contradictory ideas, to see complexity, to resist the pull of ideological certainty — that's valuable. It's just not a political program. And maybe we need both: the ideologues who push the boundaries and the centrists who test whether the new boundaries make sense. Corn: The centrist as the immune system of democracy. Not glamorous, but necessary. Herman: Something like that. Corn: Now: Hilbert's daily fun fact. Hilbert: In the early fifteen hundreds, a Spanish explorer passing through what is now Turkmenistan recorded encountering a creature he described as a "water dragon" that could regrow its severed limbs overnight. Historians now believe he had stumbled upon a population of axolotls that had been transported along Silk Road trade routes from Mexico by merchants who kept them in clay jars as curiosities — meaning the axolotl nearly became a Central Asian species three centuries before Europeans understood what it was. Corn:...I have so many questions about the logistics of transporting amphibians in clay jars across the Silk Road. Herman: The merchants must have had very patient camels. Corn: This has been My Weird Prompts. Thanks to our producer Hilbert Flumingtop. If you want to send us a question like Daniel did, email the show at show at my weird prompts dot com. We'll be back next week.