Latest / Logosofia no Dia a Dia / How Many Democracies Are There Really?
Transcript
- [Prompt] custom: We tend to talk about democracies as if they are one thing, and certainly Western democracy. Usually | Hosts: corn, herman [Response] Corn: Daniel sent us this one — he's been thinking about that episode we did on Israel's splinter-party democracy and Germany's reforms, and it got him asking something bigger. How much variability is there really within countries that operate under the democratic tradition? How many democracies even exist, and what percentage of countries actually run on democratic principles? And when we say "Western democracy" — what do we actually mean by that distinction? Because the deeper question is whether democracy is truly one thing, or whether we're looking at systems that share a common seed but whose differences might outweigh what they have in common. Herman: That last line is the one that grabs me. The differences might outweigh what they have in common. That's a genuinely provocative claim, and I think the data backs it up more than most people realize. Corn: It's the kind of thing that sounds extreme until you start looking at the actual mechanics. I mean, the gap between how Germany runs its democracy and how the U.runs its democracy — that gap might be wider than the gap between some democracies and some non-democracies on specific dimensions. Herman: And the timing on this is interesting. The Economist Intelligence Unit just released their Democracy Index for twenty twenty-five, and the headline is that democracy has stabilized after eight straight years of decline. That sounds like good news. But the real story underneath that headline is fragmentation — the category of "democracy" itself is pulling apart in ways the index struggles to capture. Corn: Stabilized where, exactly? Herman: That's the thing. Only eight point four percent of the world's population lives in what the EIU classifies as a full democracy. That's twenty-two countries out of a hundred and sixty-seven assessed. Another thirty point three percent live under flawed democracies — fifty countries. So you've got seventy-two countries total in some democratic category, but the distribution is heavily tilted toward the flawed end. Corn: When someone says "democracy is stabilizing," what they mostly mean is that the slide from flawed to hybrid has paused. Not that full democracies are flourishing. Herman: And here's where Daniel's question about Western democracy gets sharp. The term gets thrown around constantly, but when you press on it, it's rarely defined with any precision. It usually gestures at a bundle — free and fair elections, rule of law, individual rights, independent judiciary, free press. Liberal democracy, essentially. But that bundle isn't uniformly present even within the West. Corn: This is what I find fascinating. You take two countries that everyone would call Western democracies — say, Denmark and Hungary — and their scores on the V-Dem Institute's liberal democracy index are worlds apart. Denmark comes in at zero point eight nine, which is near-perfect. Hungary has dropped from zero point six two in twenty ten to zero point three five in twenty twenty-five. Herman: Zero point three five puts Hungary below Costa Rica at zero point six seven and Botswana at zero point five one. Countries that nobody would instinctively call Western democracies. Corn: The category is doing something weird. It's bundling geography and institutional quality in a way that obscures more than it clarifies. Herman: That's before you even get to the structural differences. Let's take three countries that are all unambiguously Western democracies — Germany, Israel, and the United States — and look at how they actually operationalize the thing. Corn: Israel's the extreme case here. Pure proportional representation with a three point two five percent threshold. That produces the fragmentation Daniel was talking about. Five elections between twenty nineteen and twenty twenty-two because no coalition could hold. Herman: The twenty twenty-two election was the fifth in four years. That's not a bug in their system, exactly — it's the system working as designed. The design just happens to produce extreme instability when the political landscape is fractured. Corn: Then you look at Germany. Mixed-member proportional representation with a five percent threshold. That five percent is doing enormous work — it keeps the truly fringe parties out of the Bundestag in a way Israel's three point two five percent threshold doesn't. But Germany also has this overhang seat mechanism that the Federal Constitutional Court has had to regulate repeatedly because it kept creating distortions. Herman: The Federal Constitutional Court is itself a huge differentiator. Since nineteen fifty-one, it's declared laws unconstitutional over two hundred times. That's a court with real teeth. Compare that to the UK, which doesn't even have a written constitution — their Supreme Court can interpret statutes but can't strike them down. Parliamentary sovereignty means parliament is the final word. Corn: You've got Germany with a constitutional court that can nullify laws, the UK where parliament is supreme and no court can overrule it, and the U.where the Supreme Court has judicial review but operates with lifetime appointments and these incredibly politicized confirmation battles. Those are not minor variations. They fundamentally change who has the final say on rights. Herman: Then layer on the electoral system differences. uses first-past-the-post with single-member districts, which naturally produces two-party dominance. That's not an accident — it's Duverger's law in action. But it also produces gerrymandering, winner-take-all dynamics, and primary systems that reward ideological purity. Corn: Whereas Germany's mixed-member system forces coalition-building. You never get a single party governing alone. That produces policy continuity but also what Germans call the grand coalition gridlock — when the two largest parties govern together and nobody wants to rock the boat on structural reforms. Herman: The citizen experience of democracy in these three countries is radically different. An Israeli voter's ballot translates into representation through a completely different mechanism than a German voter's or an American voter's. The way laws can be challenged, the way rights are protected, the way coalitions form or don't form — these aren't cosmetic differences. Corn: Which brings us back to Daniel's core question. If the mechanisms are this different, and the outcomes are this different, in what meaningful sense are these all the same thing? Herman: The common seed is real — periodic elections, some form of representation, some form of accountability. But I think Daniel's instinct is right that the differences might be more consequential than what they share. The seed is the least interesting part of the plant. Corn: That's almost poetic for you. Herman: I have my moments. Corn: Rare, but they happen. So let's actually dig into this. How many democracies are there really, what do we mean by Western democracy, and what specific mechanisms produce all this variability? Because I think most people sense that democracies differ, but they don't appreciate how structural and how consequential those differences are. Herman: The EIU stabilization headline is the perfect entry point, because it invites exactly the wrong question. It invites "are things getting better or worse?" when the real question is "better or worse on which dimension, in which kind of democracy, through which mechanism? Herman: The question splits in two. One is taxonomic — how do we sort these things? The other is substantive — do the differences actually matter for how people live under these systems? Corn: I think the taxonomic question is mostly a distraction, honestly. Whether we call something a democracy with an asterisk or a hybrid regime doesn't change what's happening on the ground. The substance is where it gets interesting. Herman: And the substance question has real stakes. If we treat democracy as a single thing, we miss that a country can be backsliding on liberal rights while its electoral machinery keeps humming along. The EIU's own framework acknowledges this implicitly — they use five categories, not two. Full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime, authoritarian, full authoritarian. That's already a concession that the binary doesn't work. Corn: If it were just democracy versus autocracy, you'd have two boxes. Five boxes means the people building the index know the spectrum is real. And even five boxes might not be enough. Herman: That's exactly what the V-Dem Institute has been arguing. Their Democracy Report for twenty twenty-six measures democracy across five distinct principles — electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian. A country can score high on one and low on another. That's not a bug in the measurement. It's the point. Corn: What we're really doing here is laying out three things. First, how many countries actually operate under democratic principles, and what the distribution looks like — because most people overestimate how many full democracies exist. Second, what specific mechanisms produce the variability — electoral systems, judicial design, constitutional structure. And third, the provocative question Daniel ended on — whether the differences between democratic systems are more consequential than what they share. Herman: I'd argue that third question is the one that changes how you read the news. When you see a headline about democratic backsliding in Hungary versus backsliding in India versus backsliding in the United States, those are three different stories happening through three different mechanisms. Collapsing them into one narrative isn't just imprecise — it's misleading. Corn: It also changes what you think the solutions are. If you think democracy is one thing, you think the fix is one thing. If you think it's multiple dimensions, you start asking which dimension is broken and what specifically needs repair. Herman: Which is a much harder conversation. But a more honest one. Herman: Let's start with the numbers, because they're more stark than most people realize. The EIU looked at a hundred sixty-seven countries. Twenty-two qualified as full democracies. That's it. About thirteen percent of countries. And those twenty-two countries only hold eight point four percent of the world's population. The full democracies are mostly small — Norway, New Zealand, Iceland, Finland. The big population centers are elsewhere. Corn: Almost ninety-two percent of humanity lives somewhere other than a full democracy. That's a sobering baseline. Herman: Even within that twenty-two, the variation is enormous. Take electoral system design — this is where the variability gets structural. Israel uses pure proportional representation with a three point two five percent threshold. Any party that clears that gets seats in proportion to its vote share. The result is a Knesset with sometimes a dozen parties, where a faction representing four percent of voters can make or break a coalition. Corn: Which is how you get five elections in four years. The twenty twenty-two election wasn't a crisis of democracy — it was the system producing exactly what it was designed to produce. The design just assumes a political culture that can form stable coalitions, and when that culture frays, you get paralysis. Herman: Germany looked at this problem and built a different machine. Mixed-member proportional — you get two votes, one for a local candidate and one for a party list. The five percent threshold keeps micro-parties out. But then you get the overhang seat problem. If a party wins more direct district seats than its proportional share would allow, the Bundestag expands. The Federal Constitutional Court has had to step in repeatedly to force reforms because the mechanism kept creating perverse outcomes. Corn: The court basically told the legislature "your math is broken, fix it." And the legislature had to comply. That's a completely different power dynamic than what you see in the UK, where no court can tell parliament anything. Herman: The UK's arrangement is almost the inverse. No written constitution, no judicial review that can strike down primary legislation. The Supreme Court can interpret statutes, but if parliament doesn't like the interpretation, parliament changes the statute. Parliamentary sovereignty means the legislature is the final authority on rights, on procedure, on everything. Corn: is a third model entirely. A written constitution, yes, but one that's extraordinarily difficult to amend. Judicial review through a Supreme Court with lifetime appointments. The confirmation process has become a political blood sport. So you've got nine unelected people with effectively unreviewable power over fundamental rights, chosen through a process that's become entirely partisan. Herman: Those three systems produce completely different answers to the question "who has the final word?" In Germany, it's the constitutional court, bounded by the Basic Law's eternity clauses — certain principles cannot be amended, period. In the UK, it's parliament, full stop. In the U., it's the Supreme Court, but with a selection mechanism that makes every vacancy a proxy war. Corn: The eternity clauses in Germany's Grundgesetz are worth pausing on. Human dignity, the democratic and social federal structure, the rule of law — these are not up for revision. You can't amend them away even with a supermajority. That's a constitutional commitment to liberal democracy that the UK's unwritten constitution simply can't make. Herman: Because the UK's constitution is whatever parliament says it is this week. That's not a criticism — it's the logic of parliamentary sovereignty. But it means the institutional guardrails are entirely different. What protects rights in the UK is political culture and convention, not a document a court can enforce. Corn: When we say "Western democracy," we're smuggling in assumptions about which of these models is the default. But there is no default. Germany, the UK, and the U.are all Western democracies, and their systems are built on fundamentally different answers to the most basic questions of governance. Herman: Those institutional differences aren't just academic — they produce radically different political cultures and policy outcomes. Take Israel's fragmentation. When you need sixty-one seats and a party with four seats can make or break your coalition, those four-seat parties extract concessions wildly disproportionate to their electoral weight. Corn: The ultra-Orthodox parties have been doing this for decades. They don't represent very many Israelis, but they've secured draft exemptions and religious institution funding that shape the entire state's character. And the far-right parties in the most recent coalitions did the same thing in a different direction — small vote share, enormous policy leverage. Herman: That's the pure proportional representation trade-off. You get representation that mirrors voter preferences almost perfectly, but you also get policy hostage situations. The twenty twenty-three judicial overhaul crisis wasn't just about the courts — it was a coalition held together by parties whose only common ground was wanting to weaken judicial review, each for their own reasons. Corn: Germany's coalition culture produces a different pathology. When the CDU and SPD govern together in a grand coalition, you get stability and continuity, but you also get what Germans call reformstau — reform gridlock. Nobody wants to risk the coalition by pushing structural changes, so you get small-bore adjustments while big problems accumulate. Herman: two-party system produces polarization of a completely different kind. Because each party has to aggregate wildly different factions under one tent, the primary system becomes the real battleground. A candidate's biggest threat isn't the other party — it's a primary challenge from the flank. So you get ideological purity tests that pull both parties away from the center. Corn: The mechanism is different in each case, but the outcome is the same — the system shapes what kind of politics is possible. Israel's fragmentation empowers sectarian veto players. Germany's coalition culture rewards cautious incrementalism. America's primary system rewards polarization. Those aren't cultural preferences floating free of institutions. They're produced by the institutions. Herman: Which brings us to the practical implication that I think most coverage misses entirely. The democracy versus autocracy binary obscures more than it reveals. India is a case in point. V-Dem gives India a score of zero point nine one on clean elections — that's strong. But on freedom of expression, India scores zero point five two. That's a country that runs credible elections while simultaneously constricting the information environment those elections operate in. Corn: Is India a democracy? On the electoral dimension, absolutely. On the liberal dimension, it's sliding. The binary forces you to pick a box, but the interesting information is in the split. Herman: The split goes the other way too. Singapore scores zero point eight nine on V-Dem's judicial constraints index — strong rule of law, independent judiciary. But Singapore has no electoral democracy at all. The People's Action Party has governed continuously since nineteen sixty-five. You get predictable legal frameworks without competitive politics. Corn: Singapore outranks plenty of electoral democracies on the rule-of-law dimension while failing the most basic electoral test. That's not a contradiction — it's evidence that the dimensions are independent. Strong courts don't guarantee free elections. Free elections don't guarantee strong courts. Herman: The EIU's five-category system is itself a concession that the binary doesn't work. Full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid, authoritarian, full authoritarian — that's five boxes because reality refused to fit in two. And even five might not be enough, because what do you do with a country like India that's strong on one dimension and weak on another? Corn: This is where Daniel's provocative take starts looking less provocative and more like common sense. The differences between some democratic systems may be more consequential than what they share. Compare the lived experience of a voter in the U.versus the UK. Both countries use first-past-the-post, so you'd think they'd be similar. But a British voter's parliamentary system means the executive emerges from the legislature and can be removed by it. An American voter's presidential system means the executive is separately elected and mostly immune from legislative removal outside impeachment. Herman: A British citizen's rights are whatever parliament says they are this week — no written constitution, no judicial review that can strike down primary legislation. An American citizen's rights are mediated by a two-hundred-year-old document interpreted by nine unelected judges with lifetime tenure. Those are fundamentally different answers to the question "what protects me from the state? Corn: The common seed — periodic elections, some form of representation — that's real but it's the least interesting part. It's like saying a whale and a hummingbird are both animals. True, but the interesting stuff is in the differences. Herman: What does this mean for how we evaluate democracies? The V-Dem framework gives us a way out of the single-axis trap. Five principles — electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian. You score a country on all five, and the profile is the information. A country that's high on electoral and low on liberal is a different kind of democracy than one that's high on both, and the challenges it faces are different. Corn: That reframes the whole conversation about democratic backsliding. When Hungary's liberal democracy score drops from zero point six two to zero point three five over fifteen years, that's a specific kind of erosion — it's the liberal dimension collapsing while electoral mechanisms keep functioning. The elections still happen, they're just increasingly meaningless as checks on power. Herman: Whereas what's happened in the U.post-twenty twenty is different — it's erosion in electoral integrity metrics specifically, around trust in results and the mechanics of certification. Different mechanism, different dimension, different problem. Corn: Collapsing those into one story called "democratic backsliding" isn't just imprecise. It points you toward the wrong solutions. If you don't know which dimension is breaking, you don't know what needs fixing. Herman: If we're giving listeners something they can actually use, it's this. When you're evaluating any country's political system, don't ask "is it a democracy?" Ask which dimension you're assessing. Electoral integrity, liberal rights, participatory mechanisms, deliberative quality, egalitarian outcomes. A country can be strong on one and weak on another, and that split is the interesting information. Corn: The single-axis thinking is the problem. Once you start asking "strong on what, weak on what," the whole conversation shifts from labeling to understanding. Herman: Second thing — and this one's going to annoy people — the term "Western democracy" should either be retired or defined every single time it's used. It conflates geography, history, and institutional design in ways that obscure more than they clarify. Germany and the U.are both Western democracies. Their differences in electoral systems, judicial review, and constitutional structure are enormous. The label pretends they're variations on a theme when they're really different answers to the same questions. Corn: It's a term that does its work by being vague. The vagueness is the point. It lets you gesture at a tradition without specifying which institutional choices you're actually talking about. Herman: The third thing, which follows from the first two — when you hear "democracy is under threat," ask which democracy, in what specific dimension, through what mechanism. Hungary's backsliding is the liberal dimension collapsing while elections keep running. post-twenty twenty is electoral integrity erosion. India is freedom of expression and minority rights declining while electoral machinery stays credible. Different mechanisms, different problems, different responses. Corn: If you don't know which dimension is breaking, you don't know what needs fixing. And you're vulnerable to people selling one-size-fits-all solutions to problems that are distinct. Herman: That stability headline from the EIU — democracy stabilizing after eight years of decline — that's where I want to land, because it might be the most misleading good news of the year. Corn: Stability can mean the patient stopped getting worse. It doesn't mean the patient got better. Herman: And the EIU's own data shows that what's stabilized is the electoral machinery. Elections are still happening, they're still competitive in most places. But the liberal dimensions — freedom of expression, judicial independence, minority rights — those can keep eroding even while the electoral score holds steady. The stability might be masking a slower, quieter decay in the dimensions that are harder to measure. Corn: The question Daniel's prompt leaves us with is unsettling. If democracy isn't one thing, what does democratic backsliding even mean? Are we seeing one global trend, or are different kinds of democracies backsliding in different ways for different reasons? Herman: I think the evidence points toward the second one. Hungary's backsliding is about liberal rights collapsing while elections continue. India's is about the information environment and minority protections while electoral integrity stays credible. post-twenty twenty is about trust in the mechanics. Those aren't the same story. Corn: Which means the next decade is going to test whether the multidimensional framework becomes standard in political analysis, or whether we keep reaching for the single-axis narrative because it's simpler. Herman: My bet is the single-axis narrative hangs on for a while. It's easier to say "democracy is in trouble" than to explain which dimension is eroding where and why. But the data is making it harder and harder to sustain. Corn: That's the open question worth sitting with. If we accept that democracy is multiple things — that the differences between democratic systems can outweigh what they share — then we have to rethink the entire vocabulary we use to talk about political health. The words we reach for might be pointing us at the wrong problems. Herman: Which is a fitting place to leave it, because that's not a question with a clean answer. It's a question that should change how you read the next headline. Corn: Now: Hilbert's daily fun fact. Hilbert: In the nineteen twenties, Hanseatic League trade rules — long defunct by then — were briefly cited in a French colonial court in Chad to resolve a dispute over salt caravan tariffs, on the grounds that the league's medieval salt ordinances were the only written body of trade law both parties could agree to reference. Corn: A medieval German trade league settling a dispute in nineteen twenties Chad. Herman: I have so many questions and I'm going to ask none of them. Corn: This has been My Weird Prompts. Thanks to our producer Hilbert Flumingtop. If you found this useful, rate and review wherever you listen — it helps other people find the show. We'll be back next time.